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BALANCING THE EQUITIES: CONSIDERING
THE “FLIP-SIDE” OF THE UBIT AND
FORMING A WORKABLE SOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Professors Anup Malani and Eric Posner published a
controversial article, which argued that tax benefits currently available to
nonprofit organizations should be extended to for-profit companies doing
charitable work.1 They based their argument on the assumption that
nonprofit tax benefits were created to encourage and reward “communitybenefit” work, and not the choice to refrain from distributing profits.2 They
argued that conditioning tax benefits on the work of the organization,
irrespective of its chosen corporate form, would incentivize for-profit firms
to produce public goods.3 According to Malani and Posner, this approach is
important because for-profit firms will produce these goods more efficiently
than their nonprofit counterparts.4
Although the extension of tax benefits would likely increase the overall
production of public goods,5 there are a number of ways in which the
implementation of Malani and Posner’s proposal would degrade the
charitable sector. Consequently, this proposal has received a great deal of
criticism.6 Most critiques reflect the concern that an extension of 501(c)(3)7
tax benefits to for-profit organizations would severely diminish the utility
of the “nondistribution constraint,”8 which arguably does most of the work
in distinguishing charitable organizations.9
The most common attacks on this proposal include (1) without the
“nondistribution constraint,” determining which organizations should be
eligible for tax benefits would be administratively untenable;10 (2) without
the “nondistribution constraint,” the government would be forced to define

1. Anup Malani & Eric Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2023
(2007). “The issue we raise is the flip side of the UBIT debate: should for-profit firms be taxed
like nonprofit firms (or more precisely, be exempt from taxes like nonprofit firms) when they
engage in charitable activities? Our answer is yes, because there is no reason to condition the tax
subsidy for charitable activities on organizational form.” Id.
2. Id. at 2029.
3. Id. at 2022.
4. Id. at 2022, 2055.
5. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Essay, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437,
2464 (2009).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 12–16.
7. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
8. The “nondistribution constraint” is a term coined by Henry Hansmann to describe the
prohibition on the distribution of profits generated by nonprofit organizations. Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) [hereinafter The Role
of Nonprofit Enterprise].
9. See Victor Fleisher, Response, “For Profit Charity”: Not Quite Ready for Prime Time, 93
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 231, 231–32 (2008) [hereinafter For Profit Charity].
10. See, e.g., id.
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charity more precisely, which would stifle experimentation by nonprofits;11
(3) profit-making motives would prompt managers and entrepreneurs to
sacrifice quality in order to retain a profit, which could go largely unnoticed
because of “contract failure”;12 (4) people would engage in tax avoidance
and arbitrage, and as a result, the tax base would be eroded;13 and (5) an
increase in for-profit philanthropy would weaken the public perception that
charities are altruistic, which would inhibit the growth and success of the
charitable sector.14
These critiques are primarily focused on the issue of charitable
deduction.15 They consider how the ability of an individual to deduct a
donation to a for-profit entity from their taxable income would affect the
nonprofit sector and the tax base. Conversely, this note will focus on the
extension of income tax exemption to for-profit organizations engaged in
charitable work. It will analyze and critique the extension of tax exemption
to three categories of charitable work done by for-profit organizations.
These three categories of for-profit charitable endeavors include: (1) the
hybrid organization that is vested with a social mission and a market
philosophy;16 (2) the commercial service provider of public goods;17 and (3)
the corporation that practices corporate social responsibility.18 Malani and
Posner’s proposal would extend tax benefits to each type of for-profit

11. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives,
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX. L. REV. 221, 254–55 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane, Response, Decoupling?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 235, 240–41
(2008). “Contract failure” is a term coined by Henry Hansmann. Hansmann theorized that one
problem faced by donors and consumers of charitable organizations is consumers’ inability to
measure the quality of the goods or services purchased. This problem is generally created by the
nature of the service, or the disconnection between the purchaser and the beneficiary. Hansmann
believes that by ensuring that organizations do not distribute profits, consumers and donors will
more readily invest in these goods and services. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note
8, at 844–47; see also Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role
of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 519–21 (2010) [hereinafter Theorizing the
Charitable Tax Subsidies].
13. See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horowitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2010) [hereinafter The Attack on
Nonprofit Status].
14. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1213–14 (2010).
15. See supra notes 11–15.
16. See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 337, 339 (2009) [hereinafter Law and Choice of Entity].
17. Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of Capitalism to Consider
the Creation of Social Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743, 759 (2009/2010).
18. See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social
Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 856–57 (2008). Kerr formulates a
spectrum of corporate social responsibility. One of the categories on this spectrum, “CompliancePlus,” encapsulates the sort of activity that this note ascribes to the term “corporate social
responsibility.” Id. Kerr describes these businesses as those that “abide by current laws relating to
social welfare--labor practices, environmental policies, anticorruption measures, and the like--but
go beyond mere compliance to integrate socially responsible practices into the model.” Id. at 857
(footnote omitted).
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organization. Their reasoning, however, does not account for the disparate
effects that would result from extending the same tax benefits to these
organizations.19 They take a utilitarian approach; they believe that by
rewarding the desired work—as opposed to the organization’s mission—the
organization’s output of public goods and efficiency will increase.20
Malani and Posner argue that just as nonprofit firms are taxed for
business activities that are not “substantially related” to an organization’s
charitable purpose, under the unrelated business income tax (UBIT), forprofit firms should not be taxed for the charitable work that they do.21
Malani and Posner then claim that just as the UBIT was enacted to prevent
tax discrimination against for-profit organizations competing with nonprofit
organizations, a policy should be crafted to prevent discrimination against
for-profits engaging in charitable work.22 Although Malani and Posner do
not expand on this analogy,23 one can envision a tax policy that would
operate similarly to the UBIT in order to exempt the charitable work of forprofit organizations.
This policy would allow organizations to retain their nonprofit or forprofit status, while simultaneously rewarding organizations for their
production of public goods. Just as the UBIT aims to prevent unfair
competition between for-profit and nonprofit organizations that are
engaging in the same trade or business,24 this sort of mechanism would
theoretically increase fairness. On the other hand, this policy has the
potential to create the types of unfairness against which the UBIT was
created to protect.25
Despite the difficulty presented by this potential unfairness, the UBIT
provides a useful model for a tax policy that would exempt the charitable
activities of for-profit organizations. The creation of this model will help
distinguish those types of activities that are worthy of exemption. In
addition, this model will clarify the extent to which charity law must protect
against the collapse of the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit
organizations. The application of this model to the three types of for-profit
charities discussed above will illustrate the impracticability of this
generalized utilitarian approach. Finally, it will provide a basis from which
to discuss alternative reforms.
This note will argue that the line drawing required to create a tax policy
that exempts community-benefit activities would undermine Malani and
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See generally Malani & Posner, supra note 1.
Id. at 2022–23.
Id. at 2061.
Id. at 2023.
Id.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 38–39 (Comm. Print. 2005) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. REPORT].
25. Id. at 5.
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Posner’s goals of increased production of public goods and efficiency.26
The externalities created by the application of this type of policy would
outweigh the logical benefits. In addition to the adverse effect of this policy
on the nonprofit sector,27 the overall production of public goods would be
diminished by the increase in the administrative costs to the government28
and the potential loss of tax revenue.
Part I will discuss the three categories of for-profit organizations doing
charitable work. Part II will provide background information on the UBIT,
including a brief synopsis of its history and the rationale behind its creation.
Part III will use the UBIT as a model for a tax policy aimed at exempting
community-benefit activities carried out by for-profit organizations. Part IV
will apply this policy to the various types of for-profit charities, and reveal
the disutility of the policy. Part V will analyze the costs and the benefits of
the application of this model. This analysis will argue that the wholesale
extension of tax exemption to for-profit charities would undermine Malani
and Posner’s goal of increasing public goods. It reasons that (1) this broad
sweeping policy would erode the tax base and thus limit the ability of the
government to provide social services; and (2) the policy is inefficient
because large corporations are not likely to change their behavior based on
the money saved through tax relief, whereas, small socially driven forprofits and nonprofits would be able to reinvest and expand their charitable
pursuits with the money saved.29 Part VI will discuss an alternative to the
wholesale extension of tax exemption.
I. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOR-PROFIT
PHILANTHROPY
For-profit charities can be understood as falling into one of three
categories30: (1) hybrid organizations,31 which are for-profit entrepreneurial
organizations created for a socially beneficial purpose;32 (2) for-profit
service providers with nonprofit counterparts,33 such as hospitals, day-care
centers, and after-school programs;34 and (3) for-profit companies that
practice corporate social responsibility (CSR).35
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Malani & Posner, supra note 1, at 2022.
See supra text accompanying notes 11,14.
See For Profit Charity, supra note 9.
See infra Part V.
Although there are other ways of categorizing these organizations, for the sake of clarity,
this note uses these three categories.
31. Hybrid organizations come in a number of forms, and scholars refer to them in a variety of
ways. Some states have created separate corporate forms under which these organizations may be
incorporated. Taylor, supra note 17, at 759. These variations will not be discussed in this note
because they do not affect the analysis.
32. See Law and Choice of Entity, supra note 16, at 340.
33. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 868–69.
34. See id. at 865–68.
35. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2448.
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A. HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS
Hybrid organizations are defined by their synthesis of the market
principles of business organizations and the charitable aims typical of
nonprofit organizations.36 The allure of these organizations is that they are
free to invest in the market and are able to distribute profits to managers and
investors while simultaneously adopting a charitable mission.37 Unlike forprofit corporations that are driven by the concept of shareholder primacy—
considering activities benefitting the community as a secondary means of
driving profit—hybrid organizations are created for the purpose of doing
good.38
These organizations take on many forms, ranging from microfinance
investment firms39 to retailers.40 For example, Toms Shoes (Toms) is a large
shoe production and retail company that donates one pair of shoes to a child
living in poverty and in need of footwear for each pair of shoes sold.41
Google.org might also be viewed as a hybrid organization; however, it
is substantially different from other types of social enterprises.42 Google.org
is a for-profit entity that is funded by its parent company, Google, Inc.43
Although Google.org has retained for-profit status in order to avoid the
restrictions placed on nonprofit organizations, its primary concern is not
turning a profit.44 In fact, “Google.org views profit as a distant and unlikely
possible consequence of its activities.”45
These examples illustrate the varying degrees of emphasis that hybrid
organizations place on profit making. Whereas retailers who are largely
concerned with generating a profit may make incidental contributions to
public welfare, others like Google.org explicitly disregard profit as a
primary motive.46 Although most hybrid organizations are community
oriented and display relative indifference towards profits, the potential for
exploitation of this model warns against extending tax benefits to hybrid
organizations.47
36. Law and Choice of Entity, supra note 16, at 337.
37. See id. at 352–55 (explaining that social entrepreneurs are often driven to adopt the forprofit form because it allows them to raise capital in ways that the nonprofit form prohibits, but
acknowledging that raising capital is not an easy task for hybrid organizations).
38. See id. at 351.
39. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2450 (describing microfinance as “social
enterprise”).
40. See, e.g., One for One Movement, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/our-movement/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
41. Id.
42. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2446–52 (describing the ways in which Google.org
differs from all existing forms of for-profit philanthropy).
43. See Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without Doing Evil to Doing Good Without
Handouts: The Google.org Experiment in Philanthropy, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 87 (2008).
44. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2452.
45. Id.
46. See Taylor, supra note 17, at 756–58.
47. See For Profit Charity, supra note 9, at 232.
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B. FOR-PROFIT SERVICE PROVIDERS
For-profit service providers are organizations that retain profits for the
sale of services commonly produced by nonprofit organizations.48 Most
often, this category is comprised of organizations that are commercial in
nature but provide social services that produce positive externalities or
public goods.49 A public good is a service or good purchased by an
individual or a group but enjoyed by the entire community.50 Once
purchased, the purchaser cannot exclude others in the community from
reaping the benefits of these goods.51 For example, healthcare might be
considered a public good that is provided by for-profit, nonprofit, and
government institutions.52 Generally, the price of the care is similar across
providers, and the quality is comparable.53
Therefore, the question of how to tax these for-profit organizations has
vexed legal scholars for years.54 Malani and Posner suggest that for-profit
and nonprofit organizations should be taxed in exactly the same way,
despite their differences.55 This is problematic, however, because it would
disincentivize the adoption of the nonprofit form.56 It is important that
nonprofit organizations remain active in these industries because they
provide quality control since nonprofits are primarily concerned with
serving their constituencies rather than increasing profits.57 This missiondriven approach decreases the possibility that nonprofits will cut corners on
quality in order to increase profits.58 Quality control is particularly
important in these industries because of the potential for contract failure.59
If nonprofits are eliminated from sectors like education, childcare, and
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 868–69.
See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1204.
See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 848.
See id.
See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics
of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2003).
53. See id. at 1352. “[G]eneral hospitals of all corporate forms are very much alike. They
operate under the same healthcare regulations, provide inpatient medical care, compete against
each other for patients and doctors, derive funding from many of the same sources, and serve
seemingly comparable social functions.” Id. (footnote omitted). Horwitz goes on to unpack this
notion; she examines the empirical differences in the delivery of certain medical services across
the corporate forms and comes to the conclusion that the not-for-profit corporate form is
preferable in this industry. Id.
54. Id. at 1346; see also The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1204 (discussing
examples of alternative proposals).
55. Malani & Posner, supra note 1, at 2064–67.
56. Cf. The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1199 (providing data to support the
assertion that there is a great deal of competition among nonprofits and between nonprofits and
for-profits in industries like healthcare). It stands to reason that if tax benefits were extended to the
for-profits in these industries, nonprofits would lose the incentive to maintain a nonprofit form. Id.
57. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1205–06.
58. See id. at 1202–03.
59. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 848–49; see also Schizer, supra note
13.
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healthcare, the quality of the services would be more difficult to ensure and
would likely decline.60
C. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
CSR can be understood in a variety of ways; however, it generally
connotes a company’s dedication to regulatory compliance and ethical
practices, and often implies that a corporation engages in activity that
advances the interests of the community in which it operates.61 This activity
can take the form of company-wide community service outings,
partnerships with nonprofit organizations, financial outreach to local
communities, or the production of socially conscious products.62 CSR has
become essentially a requirement for large companies.63 Over the past few
decades, as the public has grown more aware of the environmental and
societal impact of manufacturing practices, companies have increasingly
infused their products and brands with socially conscious messages.64
Examples of these practices are everywhere. For instance, Target, Inc.
(Target) commits 5 percent of its income to various forms of community
outreach.65 One example of Target’s community outreach program is its
literacy initiative, which provides needy schools with books, supports
literacy organizations, and makes grants to community literacy programs.66
Starbucks, Inc. (Starbucks) takes its social responsibility a step further;67
although Starbucks is not a social enterprise willing to sacrifice profit for
the greater good, its mission is imbued with social consciousness. Chief
among Starbucks’ goals is to sell exclusively ethically sourced coffee, much
of which is Fair Trade Certified.68
Assessing these activities raises important considerations, including (1)
whether it is economically efficient to exempt these organizations’
charitable activities if the tax break has a relatively minor impact on the
corporations’ ability to benefit their communities but a significant adverse
effect on the tax base; and (2) whether the potential exemption of these
activities should apply to income generated from the sale of socially

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1201, 1203–05.
See Kerr, supra note 18, at 857; see also Taylor, supra note 17, at 745, 747–48.
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2449.
See id. at 2448.
See id. at 2448–49.
TARGET, 2009 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 3 (2009), available at http://sites
.target.com/images/corporate/about/responsibility_report/2009/2009_full_report.pdf [hereinafter
TARGET CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY].
66. Id. at 5–6.
67. STARBUCKS, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: GOALS & PROGRESS 2010, available at
http://assets.starbucks.com/assets/goals-progress-report-2010.pdf [hereinafter Starbucks Global
Responsibility].
68. Id.
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responsible products, such as Starbucks coffee, or whether it should be
limited to income generated from more traditional charitable activities.
II. THE UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME TAX
The UBIT imposes a tax on 501(c)(3) organizations for revenue
generated by activity that is: (1) “a trade or business”; (2) “regularly carried
on”; and (3) “not substantially related to . . . [the] exempt purpose” of the
organization.69 Even if the profits generated by this type of activity are used
in furtherance of exempt programs, the income will be taxed.70 In other
words, the activity itself must further the exempt purpose in order for the
income generated by the activity to be exempt from tax.71
In determining whether the activity is substantially related to the
exempt purpose, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers “the size and
extent of the activit[y] . . . in relation to the nature and extent of the exempt
function that . . . [the organization] intend[s] to serve.”72 For example, if an
art program for learning disabled children sells pottery made by the kids,
the income generated by the sale of that artwork would not be subject to tax
under the UBIT.73 If, however, the teachers at the school sold their artwork
as a means of generating revenue for the school, this income might be
taxed.74
The UBIT is a relatively recent innovation.75 Before World War II, little
attention was paid to how exempt organizations generated funds; rather, the
focus was on how the funds were being used.76 Although tax-exempt
organizations were required to operate in furtherance of an exempt purpose,
they could effectuate that purpose in any number of ways, including the
operation of a profit-making business.77 This standard was dubbed the
“destination of income” test.78 The Supreme Court codified this test in
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden.79 There, the Court found that the income of a
religious organization that generated its profits from the sale and lease of
land in the Philippines was not taxable because it was used in furtherance of
its exempt purpose.80
69. I.R.S. Pub., Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, Pub. 598 at 3
(Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf [hereinafter Pub. 598]; see
also I.R.C. §§ 511–513 (2010).
70. Pub. 598, supra note 69, at 3.
71. Sean P. Scally, To Pay or Not to Pay, 37 TENN. B.J. 12, 14 (Oct. 2001).
72. Pub. 598, supra note 69, at 3.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1479 (2005).
76. See id.
77. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 100.
78. Id.
79. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582 (1924).
80. Id.
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This issue came to a head in the 1940s when Congress observed an
uptick in the formation of exempt organizations that were operating as
businesses in direct competition with tax-paying corporations.81 These
businesses, termed “feeder” organizations,82 were avoiding taxes by
devoting their profits to charity.83 For instance, the Second Circuit found
that an organization operating a private beach was tax-exempt because its
income was designated for charity.84
The use of a for-profit business as a source of revenue for New York
University highlighted the rising concerns over the proliferation of “feeder”
organizations, and their adverse effects on tax-paying organizations and the
income tax base alike.85 In 1947, a macaroni company began distributing all
of its previously taxable income to New York University School of Law.86
This practice was challenged on the grounds that the macaroni company
was not operating for an exempt purpose.87 The court held that the pasta
company was tax-exempt because all of its revenue was devoted to a
charitable purpose.88
In response to the growing use of this practice, Congress enacted the
UBIT as part of the Revenue Act of 1950.89 The tax was primarily
implemented to prevent unfair competition against for-profit organizations
operating businesses similar to “feeder” organizations.90 The tax affected all
charitable organizations other than religious organizations,91 but it did not
tax passive investment income.92
Congress modified the UBIT in 1969.93 Chief among the modifications
were the extension of the UBIT to all organizations, other than U.S.
instrumentalities exempted by §§ 501(c) and 401(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code;94 the expansion of tax liability for debt-financed income derived in

81. Stone, supra note 75, at 1479.
82. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 101. “Feeder” organizations are for-profit
companies created as a source of income for tax-exempt organizations. Id.
83. See Jessica Peña & Alexander L.T. Reid, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for
Unrelated Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1855, 1866 (2001).
84. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 101; see also Roche’s Beach, Inc. v. Comm’r, 96
F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1938).
85. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1483.
86. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120, 120–21 (3d Cir. 1951); see also Stone,
supra note 75, at 1483.
87. C.F. Mueller, 190 F.2d at 121.
88. See id. at 122–23; see also JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 101.
89. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1487.
90. See id. at 1487–88.
91. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 102.
92. Id.
93. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1487.
94. See JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 103; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL
REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 4
(Comm. Print. 1970) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT]; see also I.R.C.
§§ 401(a), 501(c) (2010).
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leaseback deals between tax-exempt organizations and corporations;95 and
various provisions aimed at limiting the use of taxable controlled
subsidiaries by tax-exempt organizations to avoid income tax.96
Since the 1969 reforms, Congress has carved out certain exceptions to
the UBIT rules.97 For example, entities are not taxed on income generated
by an exempt organization that gives away low-valued items for the
purpose of fundraising, or income generated by renting out donor mailing
lists.98 Furthermore, fundraising activities, such as charity auctions and
galas, are not taxed even if they are themselves not charitable, so long as
such activities raise funds for charitable purposes.99
Congress submits that the passage of the original UBIT and the
subsequent reforms were, for the most part, motivated by the need to
prevent unfair competition and tax-base erosion.100 The most popular
rationale for the UBIT is that it prevents unfair competition. This unfair
competition comes in two forms: “predatory pricing”101 and the ability of
nonprofits to expand their market share by reinvesting otherwise taxable
income into their commercial businesses.102
One critique of this rationale is that it is simply unfounded.103 If
organizations operate commercial businesses to capture a financial
premium, then they have little incentive to cut prices or expand their market
shares because they want to use the money captured through exemption to
reinvest in their charitable pursuits.104 In fact, the tendency for nonprofits to
invest income generated by their commercial pursuits in their charitable
activities has been supported by qualitative and quantitative research on the
subject.105

95. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 103–04; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
REFORM ACT, supra note 94, at 4.
96. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 103–04.
97. Id. at 104.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 105.
100. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1488–92; but see id. at 1492–94 (explaining that there are
alternative explanations for the enactment of the UBIT that are ignored by the government).
101. “Predatory pricing” refers to the ability of nonprofit organizations to offer lower prices
than their for-profit counterparts for the same goods and services as a result of their tax
advantages. See John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 487, 530 (2002); see also Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A
Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2493
(2005) [hereinafter Rediscovering Vulgar Charity].
102. See Colombo, supra note 101, at 530; see also Rediscovering Vulgar Charity, supra note
101, at 2493.
103. See Colombo, supra note 101, at 530; see also Stacey Y. Abrams, Devolution’s Discord:
Resolving Operational Dissonance with the UBIT Exemption, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 877, 898
(1999).
104. See Colombo, supra note 101, at 530; see also Rediscovering Vulgar Charity, supra note
101, at 2495; Abrams, supra note 103, at 899.
105. See Rediscovering Vulgar Charity, supra note 101, at 2494.
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Even if one accepts that the concern of unfair competition is legitimate,
many critics believe the UBIT is ineffective at solving this problem.106 First,
the UBIT does not explicitly require that all nonprofit business activities
that are similar to for-profit activities be taxed. Nonprofits can easily
integrate their mission into these commercial activities, rendering them
related to the exempt purpose.107
Second, the self-reporting system, used to enforce the UBIT, presents
opportunities for nonprofits to evade the UBIT.108 Tax-exempt
organizations have a great deal of discretion in determining which incomegenerating activities are taxable under the UBIT.109 Not only are the
requirements subject to interpretation by the organizations, but
organizations may also allocate costs of an exempt activity to an unrelated
activity in order to diminish the reported net income.110 Although the IRS
may investigate to ensure that the reporting is accurate, it is not always easy
to verify the nature of the activity.111 Furthermore, exempt organizations
have every incentive to avoid reporting unrelated business activity because
evidence of too much of this activity has the potential to threaten an
organization’s 501(c)(3) status.112
The other rationale offered by Congress for the creation of the UBIT
was that it would prevent tax-base erosion.113 This rationale is also subject
to question.114 The UBIT standard is malleable enough, that with good tax
planning, the tax revenue generated by the UBIT is not sufficient to justify
its existence.115 Furthermore, other rules restricting nonprofit commercial

106. See Peña & Reid, supra note 83, at 1866–67.
107. See Colombo, supra note 101, at 532; see also Peña & Reid, supra note 83, at 1866;
Rediscovering Vulgar Charity, supra note 101, at 2495. Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A. Borowski,
Nonprofits: America’s Growth Industry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 18, 1993, at A.1 (citing to a series
of news articles detailing the trend among large nonprofit organizations to “mov[e] beyond their
core mission into commercial businesses that have little, if anything, to do with their exempt
purpose”). Gaul and Borowski attributed this trend to the fact that “[u]nder the tax code,
nonprofits are allowed to operate commercial subsidiaries - so long as they pay taxes on that
income and those activities don’t overshadow their exempt mission.” Id.
108. Evelyn Brody & Joseph Cordes, The Unrelated Business Income Tax: All Bark and No
Bite?, in EMERGING ISSUES IN PHILANTHROPY, at 2 (Urban Inst. & Hauser Ctr., Seminar Series,
2001).
109. See id.
110. See Richard Sansing, The Unrelated Business Income Tax, Cost Allocation, and
Productive Efficiency, 2 NAT’L TAX J. 291, 292 (1998).
111. See Heather Gottry, Note, Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service Organizations &
Social Entrepreneurship, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 271 (1999).
112. See Glenn M. Gomes & James M. Owens, Commercial Nonprofits, Untaxed
Entrepreneurialism, and “Unfair Competition,” 36 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 8, 14 (1988).
113. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1491.
114. See id.
115. See Peña & Reid, supra note 83, at 1867 (footnote omitted) (“Many others have written
about the ways in which UBIT has failed not only to regulate commercial activity in charities
generally, but even to accomplish the purposes for which it was enacted.”).
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activity are more effective at preventing tax-base erosion and unfair
competition.116
Since the creation of the UBIT, these arguments have been subject to
debate. Advocates of the UBIT feel that it is ill defined and inadequately
enforced.117 Meanwhile, critics believe that the UBIT is altogether
unnecessary because it does not achieve its purported goals.118 Despite these
criticisms and proposals for reform, however, the government continues to
uphold the UBIT. For better or for worse, the UBIT is here to stay. The
government has maintained its dedication to balancing the interests of the
charitable sector and the fairness of the market.
III. THE UBIT AS A MODEL FOR A TARGETED TAXEXEMPTION POLICY
Malani and Posner argue that the UBIT was established “to eliminate
tax discrimination against for-profits competing against nonprofits in noncommunity-benefit markets.”119 Although the effectiveness of the UBIT at
achieving fairness has been questioned,120 the UBIT nevertheless provides a
useful framework from which to fashion a policy that affords for-profit
organizations tax benefits. Under this model, a for-profit organization could
file for income tax exemption for income derived from a “trade or business”
that is “regularly carried on” and “substantially related to an exempt
purpose.” Like the UBIT, this policy would require corporations to
determine which activities fall into this category through a self-reporting
system121 and would require the IRS to be responsible for investigating
potential wrongdoing.122
While Malani and Posner did not directly envision the use of a UBITlike policy, their rhetorical analogy123 provides perhaps the most useful
policy proposal. The UBIT serves as a useful model for two reasons: (1) it
shares Malani and Posner’s goal of achieving a fair result; and (2) it is a
policy aimed at activity as opposed to organizational form. The application
and interpretation of the UBIT serve as helpful predictors of how the
proposal would operate and how its application would vary based on the
type of organization at issue. Furthermore, the criticism of the UBIT is
useful in analyzing the utility of this proposal and others like it.

116. Colombo, supra note 101, at 507; see also Rediscovering Vulgar Charity, supra note 101,
at 2495.
117. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1494–98 (discussing existing critiques of the UBIT).
118. See id.
119. See Malani & Posner, supra note 1, at 2061.
120. Rediscovering Vulgar Charity, supra note 101, at 2494.
121. See Pub. 598, supra note 69, at 2.
122. See id.
123. See Malani & Posner, supra note 1, at 2061.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE TARGETED TAX-EXEMPTION
PROPOSAL
The application of the policy outlined above to each of the three types
of for-profits will reveal the tensions that underlie this debate and the
disutility of applying a uniform policy to all for-profit organizations.
Furthermore, it will illustrate the impossibility of conditioning tax
exemption solely on the production of public good.
A. HYBRID SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
As discussed above, hybrid organizations bear a strong resemblance to
entrepreneurial nonprofits.124 The only meaningful differences between
nonprofits and these for-profit entities are their abilities to invest in equity,
distribute profits, and engage in political lobbying.125 Furthermore, although
hybrid organizations enjoy the flexibility of managing their profits as they
see fit, these organizations are rarely motivated by significant financial
gain.126
The similarity between nonprofit and for-profit social enterprises makes
the application of this policy to these hybrid organizations relatively
simple.127 Take, for example, Toms. On its face, this company looks like
any other shoe manufacturer. It manufactures a unique style of shoes and
sells them in stores all over the country.128 However, for each pair of shoes
sold, the company donates a pair to a child in need living in a developing
country.129 Toms also partners with healthcare providers and educational
organizations already working in the targeted communities.130 These
organizations give away the shoes and provide the children with the
education and healthcare they need.131
Although Toms was founded with the mission of accomplishing an
exempt purpose,132 Toms’ activities would not be exempt under this policy.
The first two requirements are easily met. Toms generates its income
through the sale of shoes, which is a “regularly carried on” business by a
nonexempt organization. It is unclear, however, whether the activity itself,
the sale of shoes, is “substantially related” to Toms’ exempt purpose. One
could argue that selling the shoes promotes the buyer’s understanding of the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See discussion supra Part I.A.
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2452.
See id.
See Taylor, supra note 17, at 756.
See TOMS Company Overview, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/corporate-info/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2011).
129. One for One, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/one-for-one (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
130. How We Give, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/how-we-give (last visited Oct. 9,
2011).
131. Id.
132. See FAQs: For-profit or Non-profit, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/eyewear/faq#forprofit-or-non-profit (last visited Dec. 20, 2010) [hereinafter TOMS FAQs].
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struggles of underprivileged communities.133 The sale of these shoes could
also be viewed as “defending human . . . rights.”134 These arguments,
however, are somewhat attenuated.
Realistically, Toms is similar to the pasta factory distributing income to
New York University School of Law. Just like the pasta factory, Toms is
operating a traditional profit-making business so that it can fund its
charitable activities.135 Although this business is worthy of tax exemption in
the sense that its work is laudable, this is precisely the type of business that
the UBIT was created to tax.136 It is, for lack of a better term, a “feeder”
organization.137 While the typical “feeder” organization has no substantive
relationship to the charity for which it operates (there is no substantive
relationship between pasta and law school),138 the fact that Toms sells shoes
and gives away shoes as part of its charitable mission does not set it apart
from other types of “feeder” organizations.139
Other types of social enterprises, however, might qualify for tax
exemption because the nature of their income-generating activity is
substantially related to an exempt purpose. Consider, for example, a
business that trains and employs indigent teenagers. The work done by the
teens generates the income but is substantially related to multiple exempt
purposes, such as aiding the poor, promoting education, and preventing
community deterioration.140 Under the targeted tax-exemption policy, the
income generated by the work of the teens would be exempt, and income
derived from other activities carried on by the organization would not.
While the second example illustrates the potential strength of this
policy, there is something troubling about the disparate impact that the
policy would have on these two organizations. Both organizations are
designed to serve underprivileged children,141 and both put their social
missions before their financial bottom line.142 These two organizations
should not be treated differently, but, under this policy, they would be. In
order to remedy this problem, the requirement that the activity be
“substantially related” to the exempt purpose would have to be read very
broadly. It would have to be read so broadly that it might undermine the

133. Exempt Purposes - Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=175418,00.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2011) [hereinafter Exempt Purposes]; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
134. See Exempt Purposes, supra note 133; see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
135. See TOMS FAQs, supra note 132.
136. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1479.
137. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 101.
138. See IRC 502 – Feeder Organizations, in Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional
Education (CPE) (1983), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicf83.pdf.
139. See id.
140. See Exempt Purposes, supra note 133; I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
141. See TOMS Company Overview, supra note 128.
142. See id.
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purpose of the UBIT,143 and inadvertently allow for the exemption of
income generated by organizations that are far less committed to public
good.
B. FOR-PROFIT SERVICE PROVIDERS
The application of the targeted tax-exemption policy to for-profit
service providers presents an entirely different problem. As discussed
above, for-profit service providers operate businesses that are nearly
identical to their nonprofit counterparts.144 For example, for-profit hospitals
offer the same services as nonprofit hospitals at similar prices.145 Thus, if
the targeted tax-exemption policy were applied to a for-profit hospital,
nearly all of its income would be exempt. The business is “regularly carried
on,” and the income generating activity is “substantially related to an
exempt purpose.” The same could be said of for-profit day-care centers or
for-profit theaters.146
The extension of tax benefits to these for-profits would effectively
eliminate the incentive for a service provider of this kind to form as a
nonprofit.147 This is worrisome because these types of services suffer from
“contract failure”; the nature of the services makes it nearly impossible for
the consumers to measure their quality.148 For example, nursing home
patients are often too sick or unaware of their circumstances to measure the
quality of their care or to advocate for themselves if their care is lacking.149
Moreover, this care is often paid for by a patient’s family or medical
insurance provider, which further limits the nursing home’s accountability
to the patient.150 Therefore, the consumer of this care must be able to trust
the provider to ensure quality.151 Similarly, parents are unable to fully
evaluate the quality of their child’s day-care center.152 There are basic
measures of course, like safety, which are easy to ascertain. Optimal
stimulation or social interaction, however, is much more difficult to
measure.153
Henry Hansmann believes that nonprofits are more trustworthy in these
sectors than their for-profit counterparts because they have no reason to cut

143. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change its Stance on
Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 32 (2005).
144. See discussion supra Part I.B.
145. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1201–03.
146. Id. at 1201–03.
147. See id. at 1202.
148. See id.
149. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 863–65.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 865.
153. See id.
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costs for quality or shirk on promises.154 As a result, the presence of
nonprofits in these markets prevents for-profits organizations from taking
advantage of unsuspecting consumers.155 An increase in for-profit presence
in these sectors would drive out the nonprofit quality controllers.156
In order to exempt a for-profit service provider’s income without
reaching the result outlined above, the policy would have to place limits on
the destination of the income. This is clearly an undesirable result since the
purpose of creating a policy like this is to provide tax benefits to for-profit
organizations without forcing them to comply with the nondistribution
constraint.
C. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Finally, the application of the targeted tax-exemption policy to CSR
might be the most workable, and yet, the most problematic application.
Unlike social enterprise that suffers from under-inclusion, or the for-profit
service provider that would subsume its nonprofit counterparts,
corporations practicing CSR would be well served by the policy, without
adversely affecting nonprofits. Exempting CSR activities, however, is more
likely to severely erode the tax base.
For example, Starbucks, which sells predominately ethically sourced
coffee products,157 would likely be exempt under this policy. The sale of
ethically sourced coffee is a business that is “regularly carried on” and that
is “substantially related” to an exempt purpose—“defending human . . .
rights.”158 Starbucks designed a set of guidelines to which it holds itself
accountable called Coffee and Farmer Equity (C.A.F.E.) Practices.
According to Scientific Certification Systems, an independent certification
organization that verifies “environmental, sustainability, stewardship, food
quality, food safety and food purity claims” made by product
manufactures,159 Starbucks,
initiated C.A.F.E. (Coffee and Farmer Equity) Practices to evaluate,
recognize, and reward producers of high-quality sustainably grown coffee.
C.A.F.E. Practices is a green coffee sourcing guideline developed in
collaboration with Scientific Certification Systems (SCS), a third-party
evaluation and certification firm. C.A.F.E. Practices seeks to ensure that
Starbucks sources sustainably grown and processed coffee by evaluating
154. See id.
155. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1203 (explaining that the presence of
nonprofits in mixed markets positively affects the quality of for-profits in those markets).
156. See id.
157. Starbucks Global Responsibility, supra note 67, at 5–6.
158. See Exempt Purposes, supra note 133; I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
159. Scientific Certification Systems is an independent certification organization that verifies
“environmental, sustainability, stewardship, food quality, food safety and food purity claims”
made by product manufactures. About Scientific Certification Systems, SCIENTIFIC
CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS, http://www.scscertified.com/about_scs.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).

2011]

Balancing the Equities

227

the economic, social and environmental aspects of coffee production
against a defined set of criteria, as detailed in the C.A.F.E. Practices
Guidelines. Starbucks defines sustainability as an economically viable
model that addresses the social and environmental needs of all the
participants in the supply chain from farmer to consumer.160

As this suggests, Starbucks’ business is substantially related to more
than one exempt purpose.161 By selling ethically sourced coffee, Starbucks
benefits poor communities, protects children, and generally seeks to secure
human rights.162 Therefore, all of the income generated by the sale of
Starbucks coffee would be exempt.
Like Starbucks, many large companies are incorporating
environmentally efficient and socially conscious products into their product
lines.163 These companies would likely be tax-exempt under this targeted
tax-exemption policy. The sale of these products is not as effective as direct
financial and in-kind contributions to the underlying movements that these
companies seek to benefit.164 In most instances, however, the sale of
environmentally and socially conscious goods is the most efficient way for
corporations to participate in social movements because they are limited by
their obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.165
At first glance, this is an appealing policy because it would incentivize
more of this behavior by big companies; however, this sort of policy could
open the floodgates to substantial tax-base erosion.166 Moreover, the
potential decrease in tax revenue would result in a net loss of public good
because it would stymie government efforts to provide social services,
conduct research, and stimulate the economy.167 Furthermore, unlike taxexempt nonprofits that lessen the burden on the government by providing
aid to communities where the government otherwise would, corporations
160. Starbucks C.A.F.E. Practices, SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS, http://www.scs
certified.com/retail/rss_starbucks.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Starbucks C.A.F.E.
Practices].
161. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
162. See Starbucks C.A.F.E. Practices, supra note 160.
163. CSR: For Innovative Companies it Leads to Better Financial Performance, GLOBE-NET,
http://www.globe-net.com/articles/2010/april/10/csr-for-innovative-companies-it-leads-to-betterfinancial-performance.aspx?sub=11 (last visited Dec. 15, 2010).
164. See Matthew J. Kotchen, Green Markets and Private Provision of Public Goods, 114 J.
POL. ECON. 816, 829 (2006) (arguing that the production of goods or services that seek to promote
public good is less effective than direct donation to these efforts, and illustrating the
counterintuitive effects of the sale of socially conscious goods on the overall social welfare).
165. See Law and Choice of Entity, supra note 16, at 349–51.
166. See Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road
Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 355
(2007).
167. See Abrams, supra note 103, at 901 (explaining that nonprofit tax exemption is often
justified by charities’ need to act as a safety net for those not adequately served by government
social service programs). The article refers to charities as partners of the government in providing
social services. Id.
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practicing CSR generally have a more incidental impact on the
community.168 Many theorists do not consider nonprofit tax exemption to
have an adverse impact on the tax base because nonprofits provide the
public goods that the government would otherwise have to fund.169
Assuming that this theory is accurate, the effect of nonprofits on the tax
base is neutral; a dollar lost in tax revenue is a dollar saved by the
government.170 Exempting CSR activities, however, would create a net loss
in public goods.171
The adverse effect of this trend on tax revenue would undermine the
purpose of Malani and Posner’s proposal;172 it would decrease the overall
production of pure public goods, and increase the production of goods and
services with a tangential or indirect benefit to the community.173
V. THE INEQUITY IN EQUAL TREATMENT
The application of this policy illustrates the potential benefits and
detriments of Malani and Posner’s proposal. There would likely be an
increase in charitable activity if this policy were enacted. In some instances,
this activity even has the potential to be more efficient than charitable
activity carried out by nonprofits.174
Nevertheless, the flaws of the UBIT standards, which scholars have
critiqued for decades,175 are the source of many of the problems associated
with the targeted tax-exemption policy outlined above. Just as others have
observed through the application of the UBIT, the prongs of the test are
malleable, and therefore, difficult to apply.176 The vagueness of the
prongs177 is particularly problematic when the policy is applied to forprofits. The application of this policy illustrates the potential for arbitrary
and unfair results. These arbitrary results would undermine Malani and
Posner’s goals of efficiency and fairness.178
Moreover, unlike the UBIT, which attempts to curb tax-base erosion,179
this policy would cause severe harm to the tax base. Consequently, this note
168. See Taylor, supra note 17, at 749–51 (explaining that the shareholder primacy ethos of
corporations limit the impact that CSR has on society).
169. See Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies, supra note 12, at 518–20.
170. See id.
171. See Galle, supra note 14, at 1230.
172. See generally Malani & Posner, supra note 1.
173. See Kotchen, supra note 164, at 830–31 (explaining that the infusion of socially conscious
goods, such as fair-trade coffee, into the market may cause consumers to purchase green goods
and the like as a substitute for the provision of direct aid, reducing the overall social welfare).
174. But see The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13.
175. See generally Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 622 (1989); see also Stone, supra note 75, at 1495–528.
176. See Gomes & Owens, supra note 112, at 14; see also, Gottry, supra note 111, at 270–72.
177. See Gottry, supra note 111, at 270–72.
178. See generally Malani & Posner, supra note 1.
179. Stone, supra note 75, at 1491.
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argues that basing tax exemption solely on activity, as opposed to a
combination of activity and the organizational form, is bad public policy.
Furthermore, it argues that implementing a one-size-fits-all policy to deal
with inequities in the market is illogical.180
A. THE STANDARD IS FLAWED
The first two requirements—that the activity be a “business or trade”
and that it be “regularly carried on”—are problematic standards despite the
fact that they are relatively simple.181 In the UBIT context, the term “trade
or business” is understood to characterize activities that generate profits and
are commercial in nature.182 This is problematic in the context of this
hypothetical policy because some of the most valuable charity work carried
out by for-profit organizations does not generate a profit. Therefore, the test
is under-inclusive. For instance, a number of large corporations, such as
Target and Walmart, have established pro bono programs that provide free
goods and services to the needy.183 These organizations might be deserving
of a benefit, but they will not be eligible for any benefits under this policy
because they do not generate a profit by offering those services;184 the
activities do not constitute a “trade or business.”185
Conversely, the “regularly carried on” standard is so vague that it has
the potential to cause overreporting.186 Under the UBIT, courts tend to
assess “the frequency and continuity of the activities, the manner in which
they are conducted, and their similarity to comparable activities of
nonexempt businesses” in order “to determine whether” the activity is
“regularly carried on.”187 These factors are helpful, but vague. There is little
indication of how often or for how long the activity must be carried on.188
Nor is there a strong indication of how similar an activity must be to the
activity of its nonexempt counterpart.189 As a result, nonprofits have found
ways of interpreting this standard in such a way as to underreport these
activities.190

180.
181.
182.
183.

See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1205.
See Gottry, supra note 111, at 270–71.
See Scally, supra note 71, at 14.
See TARGET CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 65; WALMART, WALMART 2011
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 61 (2011), available at http://walmartstores.com/sites/Responsi
bilityReport/2011/default.aspx.
184. See Scally, supra note 71, at 14.
185. See id. (explaining that activities that do not generate a profit are not subject to the UBIT
even if they look like a “trade or business”).
186. See Abrams, supra note 103, at 893 (noting the ambiguity of this prong despite the
Treasury’s numerous attempts to provide guidance as to its parameters).
187. See Gottry, supra note 111, at 271 (footnote omitted).
188. See Abrams, supra note 103, at 893.
189. See id.
190. See Colombo, supra note 101, at 531.
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Similarly, the targeted tax-exemption policy could be manipulated so as
to enable for-profit organizations to overreport these activities. For instance,
NBC Universal hosts a biannual “green week” on its television channels
that seeks to integrate the promotion of green practices into much of its
programming.191 This activity is a “trade or business” and is “substantially
related to an exempt purpose,” but it is only carried on for two weeks per
year.192 However, because green week is a nationally recognized annual
celebration of the green movement, it may qualify as “regularly carried
on.”193 Furthermore, although the IRS would be empowered to investigate
potential inaccuracies in organizations’ filings, the cost of doing so might
be greater than the revenue lost through exemption.194
The third requirement, that the activity be “substantially related” to an
exempt purpose, creates an even more troubling dilemma, which strikes at
the heart of nonprofit law: how should the IRS effectively define an exempt
or charitable purpose.195 Without the safety valve of the nondistribution
constraint, the question of what charity law truly seeks to promote is
exposed.196 What does society value about charity? Although the answer to
this question is beyond the scope of this note, its importance should not be
overlooked.
Currently, exempt purposes are broadly defined as follows:
The exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3) are charitable,
religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety,
fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and
preventing cruelty to children or animals. The term charitable is used in
its generally accepted legal sense and includes relief of the poor, the
distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement
of education or science; erecting or maintaining public buildings,
monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; lessening
neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination;
defending human and civil rights secured by law; and combating
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.197

191. Green Interacts Here, NBC, http://www.nbc.com/green/about/ (last visited, Dec. 20,
2010).
192. Id.
193. See Scally, supra note 71, at 14.
194. See For Profit Charity, supra note 9, 231–33; see also Galle, supra note 14, at 1220.
195. Brakman Reiser points out that the current trends in for-profit philanthropy, particularly
Google.org’s innovative approach to philanthropy, “highlight a more fundamental issue: the utility
of the legal boundary between nonprofit and for-profit endeavor.” Brakman Reiser, supra note 5,
at 2471. Fundamental to this boundary is the nondistribution constraint. By adopting the proposal
explored in this note or one like it, this fundamental boundary is lifted and the question of what is
truly charitable is exposed.
196. See Galle, supra note 14, at 1220.
197. Exempt Purposes, supra note 133.
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This broad definition is favorable for nonprofit organizations that
require flexibility in defining their missions.198 It is problematic, however,
when considering extending tax benefits to for-profit organizations that are
not subject to the nondistribution constraint.199 As seen above, this
definition could encompass a broad range of activities, such as the sale of
green products, which could easily be undertaken without a true charitable
purpose. Without enforcement mechanisms, capable of divining a
company’s true purpose200 and monitoring the charitable impact of a
company’s activities, a policy employing such a broad definition could
easily be abused.201 For instance, an organization could sell products that
are made with recyclable materials because it believes that consumers are
more likely to purchase them, and simultaneously, the company could
exploit its factory workers. These perverse results highlight the complex
problems that arise in applying the third prong of this policy.
The even more difficult aspect of the third prong, however, is how to
access what is “substantially related” to an exempt purpose. As the
application of this policy illustrates, the use of the UBIT rubric for this
prong of the test leads to strange results.202 Under this policy, the income
generated by Starbucks’ sale of ethically sourced coffee would be exempt
whereas the income generated by Toms would not.203 Although both
organizations should be recognized for their social consciousness, one
could argue that Toms is more charitable, as it targets needy communities
and provides them with direct aid.204 More importantly, however, it is likely
that exempting Toms from income tax would have a stronger impact on the
company’s ability to affect the lives of its beneficiaries than the impact that
exempting Starbucks’ income would have on its ability to sell ethically
sourced coffee.205 Furthermore, providing income tax exemption for
198. See Schizer, supra note 11, at 254–55.
199. See For Profit Charity, supra note 9, at 232 (critiquing Malani and Posner’s proposal,
Fleisher argues that the current definition of exempt activity under section 501(c)(3) is not defined
well enough to prevent its misuse or overuse by for-profit companies).
200. Malani and Posner explicitly argue that a company’s motivation for engaging in charitable
activity should not matter if the goal is to increase production of public good. See Malani &
Posner, supra note 1, at 2064. This argument, however, ignores two important effects of a lack of
charitable intent. First, without ensuring the charitable intention of an organization, one cannot
ensure that the organization is committed to producing the good or service without creating a
negative externality for society to endure. Second, if the company’s intent is not somewhat
charitable then it is unlikely that tax exemption will provide a strong enough incentive to engage
in the activity.
201. See Galle, supra note 14, at 1220; see also For Profit Charity, supra note 9, at 232 (noting
that this would require the IRS to significantly increase its expenditure of resources on monitoring
tax-exempt organizations).
202. See discussion supra Part IV.
203. See discussion supra Part IV.A–B.
204. See One for One Movement, supra note 40.
205. Toms’ entire business model is based on the “One for One Movement,” and thus, it stands
to reason that relief from income tax would enable Toms to expand its market and thus provide
more relief. Conversely, a tax exemption would not affect Starbucks’ production of public goods.
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companies like Starbucks, as opposed to Toms, will have a much more
severe impact on the tax base.206
B. THESE FLAWS INHERE TO ANY POLICY THAT EXEMPTS FORPROFIT CHARITY
Although one could argue that this hypothetical policy is to blame for
the problems that arise out of its application, it is merely illustrative of the
inevitable consequences of a broad, sweeping policy that seeks to achieve
Malani and Posner’s goals.207 The analysis above not only demonstrates the
practical inefficiency of this policy, but it also highlights the disutility of
treating all for-profits alike and all charitable activity alike. It is tempting to
succumb to the logic that like things should be treated alike. But it does
more harm than good to ignore the differences between the various types of
for-profit and nonprofit organizations and the manner in which they
produce public goods.208
Notably, the benefit retained by hybrid organizations like Toms, as
opposed to Starbucks, is more likely to have an impact on the
organization’s charitable mission since hybrids generally have more
freedom to disregard shareholder primacy.209 That is not to say that hybrid
organizations refrain from distributing profits; however, whether money
saved through exemption goes towards employee bonuses or director
compensation, it will improve the efficiency of the organization, which will
theoretically increase the overall public good.210
This illustrates that even the most equitable policy is not a one-size-fitsall solution to Malani and Posner’s concerns. The government has
recognized this logic; personal income tax rates are based on an individual’s
level of income.211 While these tax rates are unequal, the government has
determined that they are equitable.212 If the rationale behind the UBIT were
applied to personal income tax rates, all taxpayers would be taxed at the
same rate regardless of their wealth.213 The government has recognized,
however, that this is illogical and unfair.214
206. The greater the income generated by a corporation, the higher the income tax rate imposed
on the corporation. I.R.C. § 11 (2010).
207. See infra Part VI (discussing incremental policies that would be more feasible to
implement).
208. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1218.
209. See Jay Milbrandt, Comment, A New Form of Business Entity is Needed to Promote Social
Entrepreneurship: The Not-For-Loss Corporation, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 421, 438
(2008).
210. Malani and Posner make this argument; however, they argue that this increased efficiency
and output of public goods will be operative in all for-profit firms promoting community-benefit.
See Malani & Posner, supra note 1, at 2065.
211. See I.R.C. § 1.
212. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 625–36 (1990).
213. See id. at 626–27.
214. See I.R.C. § 1.
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Professor Rob Atkinson uses this analogy to illustrate that the perceived
lack of fairness remedied by the UBIT is a misconception; he argues that it
is equitable to treat like for-profit and nonprofit business activity
differently.215 Although Atkinson’s analogy is meant to illustrate the
problems with the UBIT,216 it also suggests that the unequal treatment of
nonprofits and for-profits doing charitable work is equitable.217
Alternatively, this analogy demonstrates that certain for-profits should be
treated more like nonprofits than others in order to achieve an equitable
result.218
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO THE WHOLESALE
EXTENSION OF TAX EXEMPTION
Malani and Posner’s theory that tax exemption will incentivize existing
for-profit organizations to engage in “community-benefit” work and prompt
the formation of more socially conscious for-profit organizations is likely
accurate. Most studies, however, do not support Malani and Posner’s
assertions that a for-profit presence in the charitable sector increases
competition and efficiency.219 The hypothetical policy suggested by this
note was modeled after the UBIT in order to balance Malani and Posner’s
goal of increased output with the valid concerns posed by other scholars as
to the effects of the more aggressive reforms sought by Malani and
Posner.220 For the reasons discussed above, however, it is clear that even a
modest policy like this would undermine Malani and Posner’s goals of
increasing overall public good.221
One alternative to this policy is a reduced corporate income tax rate for
charitable business activity. This rate would vary according to the amount
of charitable activity undertaken by a company. A large for-profit
corporation, like Starbucks or Target, would have a greater incentive to
increase CSR, but the reduced rate would have a more proportionate impact
on the tax base than a wholesale exemption of income generated through
charitable activity.222 On the other hand, organizations like Toms and

215. See Atkinson, supra note 212, at 627.
216. See id. at 625–27.
217. Cf. id. (extending Atkinson’s logic to the issues raised in this note, it stands to reason that
his thesis applies with equal force to the UBIT and to the analogous policy discussed in this note).
218. See id.
219. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1199–203 (citing studies and
explaining that Malani and Posner’s assumption that nonprofits are not as efficient as for-profits is
based on the inaccurate notion that the charitable sector is not competitive).
220. See supra text accompany notes 10–14.
221. See supra Part V.
222. The proportionality referred to here regards the ratio between the public good produced
and the reduction in tax revenue.
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Google.org would enjoy a more favorable tax rate.223 This scheme, although
administratively complicated, would provide tax relief to all organizations
doing charitable work, and it would prevent the severe tax-base erosion
envisioned above.224 Furthermore, this conditional tax rate would promote
equity; the rate of reduction would vary according to the potential impact of
tax relief on an organization’s ability to provide more public goods to its
community.
This idea shares some qualities with tax credit policies that refund a
percentage of a company’s income tax when it engages in certain types of
charitable activity, such as renewable energy production.225 Like tax credits,
this reduced rate scheme would reward charitable activity by reducing a
company’s income tax expenditure.226 The benefit of the reduced rate
scheme, however, is that it would apply to any activity that served an
exempt purpose, as opposed to targeting a handful of activities that serve
the government’s pet interests.227 Furthermore, this rate reduction would be
more efficient than a tax credit because it would vary according to the
benefit that it would confer on the community.228
CONCLUSION
This note argues that the policy proposed by Malani and Posner is
unworkable and inequitable. It draws on Malani and Posner’s analogy to the
UBIT to explain how a policy based on the UBIT principles undermines
their laudable goals of increasing the production of public goods and the
efficiency of the charitable sector. Finally, this note seeks to find an
alternative approach to reaching these goals. Although the proposal above is
by no means a perfect solution, it illustrates that a policy which accounts for
the differences between organizations and their charitable efforts is more
equitable than Malani and Posner’s one-size-fits-all approach.229
Kalle Condliffe

223. These examples are meant to illustrate the application of the policy; however, both are
clearly flawed examples because under current tax rates, they would likely generate very little
taxable income. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2453.
224. See supra Part V.
225. See I.R.C. § 48 (2010).
226. Cf. id.
227. Cf. id.
228. Cf. id.
229. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1218.
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